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1. Introduction 
 
This study develops and applies an ‘Energy Constitution’ conceptual framework in order to 
elucidate certain new dimensions of fuel poverty governance.  The general assumptions 
underpinning this framework extrapolate across diverse national constitutional settings, and 
thus have an inherent facility to contribute importantly to emergent bodies of governance and 
policy knowledge from an international perspective in this area.1  The analyst is prompted to 
examine prominent multi-level dimensions of a given country’s constitutional setting, 
interconnecting the emergent vista of multi-level constitutional capacities and constraints with 
investigation of the extent to which the state’s constitutional regime structures and moderates 
a facility to govern in the sphere of energy (see further below).2  A specific energy policy issue 
can then be located and interpreted within the context of these findings (here, fuel poverty), 
permitting contributions to be made to a new body of knowledge pertaining to international 
energy studies and aspects of constitutionality.3 
 
In order to concretise the development and application of the framework, the UK is taken as a 
case-study state.4  Within the UK, particular attention is accorded to Northern Ireland.5  In order 
 
1 Amongst many examples of an emergent ‘constitutionalisation’ of energy policy studies within diverse national 
settings, see, e.g.: the consideration of the Australian experience in “Constitutional Responsibility for Managing 
Energy and Climate Change”, in Rosemary Lyster and Adrian Bradbrook, Energy Law and the Environment, 
(Cambridge UP 2006), 80-81; the examination of the influence of constitutional issues in the US energy policy 
setting in Chapter 3 (“The Art and Science of Crafting Public Policy”) of Laurance R Geri and David E McNabb, 
Energy Policy in the US: Politics, Challenges, and Prospects for Change, (CRC 2011); etc. 
2 Often, the emergent area of ‘constitutionalised’ energy analysis indicated at ibid (n.2) and infra (n.4) has a 
tendency to import studies in ‘environmental constitutionalism’ into the sphere of energy analysis, as in, e.g., 
Chapter 3 (“Ten Good Practices in Environmental Constitutionalism that can Contribute to Sustainable Shale Gas 
Development”, 30–54) of James R May and Erin Daly (eds.), Energy, Governance and Sustainability (Edward Elgar 
2016).  In the author’s view, energy policy analysts should feel encouraged to press on with developing a richer, 
more directly energy-oriented form of ‘energy constitutionalism’ in its own right.  The ‘Energy Constitution’ 
model put forward in this paper endeavours to contribute to momentum in this direction. 
3 Multi-level international constitutional matters are explored in Lesage, Dries, and Thijs Van de Graaf, Global 
Energy Governance in a Multipolar World (Routledge 2010).  See further, e.g.: Thijs Van de Graaf, Benjamin K. 
Sovacool, Arunabha Ghosh, Florian Kern, and Michael T Klare (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of the International 
Political Economy of Energy (Palgrave 2016); the extensive treatment given to energy policy and the emergent 
concern of constitutionality at Chapters 6 (“Pipelines and Principles: Reasonableness and Fairness in 
Environmental Law”) and 7 (“Reasoning Adequately: Wind Turbine Risks and Benefits”) of Jocelyn Stacey, The 
Constitution of the Environmental Emergency (Hart 2018). 
4 While all national constitutional settings are by their nature somewhat distinct, and therefore the 
constitutional environment crystallised by the type of analysis undertaken in this paper will differ to some extent 
from state to state, certain key aspects of this UK-specific study extrapolate in particularly direct ways to New 
Zealand and Israel, insofar as these states are highly unusual in that their constitutions are ‘uncodified’; see 
further the detailed discussion of the UK’s uncodified constitutional setting below.  The UK also operates a 
devolution framework, where a national and devolved level of governance can be identified (see also below); in 
an alternative system, such as the federal system of the USA, the federal and state levels of governance would 
be the equivalent primary levels at issue, given that UK-style devolution does not operate in that constitutional 
setting. 
5 The Northern Ireland Assembly and its Executive government is in collapse at the time of writing, precipitated 
by a Renewable Heat Incentive scandal.  It is hoped that the devolved institutions can be restored shortly.  See 
further Muinzer, Thomas L. ‘Incendiary Developments: Northern Ireland’s Renewable Heat Incentive, and the 
Collapse of the Devolved Government’, UKELA E-Law (99) March/April 2017: 18-21. 
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to get a detailed view of the condition of UK fuel poverty at the present time, the Annual Fuel 
Poverty Statistics Report (hereafter AFPSR) is a key point of reference.6  The report is England-
focused, however it also includes consideration of the UK’s devolved jurisdictions.7  An 
understanding of this important document in turn necessitates the reading of the Fuel Poverty 
Methodology Handbook (hereafter FPMH).8  In the context of the present study it is notable 
that the FPMH permits one to better understand why Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales are 
treated differently in terms of how fuel poverty is measured methodologically in the UK (see 
further below).9   
 
Fuel poverty arises where households cannot achieve adequate levels of heat and electricity at 
reasonable cost.  In essence, fuel poverty covers all energy services.10  Discussing the English 
context within the UK, the FPMH elaborates that in terms of ‘energy’ itself, fuel poverty 




Lights and appliances; and 
Cooking.11 
 
While this list of factors is perhaps unsurprising, it is helpful insofar as it clarifies what is meant 
by ‘energy’ in this context in relatively concrete terms.   
 
UK Government’s AFPSR states that “Fuel poverty is a devolved issue”.12  As a general or 
rhetorical claim targeted at the layperson, this statement might be sufficient (although it is 
arguable that it is insufficient).  Application of the Energy Constitution framework, however, 
which generates a high degree of accuracy in relation to the interpretation of a given state’s 
multi-level national-devolved allocation of energy powers, clarifies that the statement is 
technically incorrect.13  Applying the Energy Constitution framework in order to summarise 
 
6 Annual Fuel Poverty Statistics Report, 2018 (Crown: UK, 2018); Annual Fuel Poverty Statistics Report, 2017 
(Crown: UK, 2017); Annual Fuel Poverty Statistics Report, 2016 (Crown: UK, 2016).  The report is updated on an 
annual basis. 
7 Ibid: AFPSR, 2018, Annex C, 84-85; AFPSR, 2017, Annex B, 72; AFPSR, 2016, 23–24. 
8 Fuel Poverty Methodology Handbook (BEIS: UK, 2018).  The handbook is updated on a rolling basis by UK 
Government.  See also the preceding version, Fuel Poverty Methodology Handbook 2017 (BEIS: UK, 2017).  
References in this paper refer to the most recent version (2018) unless otherwise stated. 
9 The Handbook is current at the time of writing (“This is the 2018 version of this document, relating to the 2016 
fuel poverty figures, and supersedes all earlier methodology documents and updates”, 1). 
10 A lack of definitional clarity that sometimes arises in relation to the meaning of ‘fuel poverty’ is not always 
helped by the sometimes-overlapping use of the term ‘energy poverty’.  The latter term tends to refer to 
problems in developing nations / less economically developed countries, and pertains to energy being safe, 
reliable and affordable, although the Republic of Ireland uses the term in a roughly equivalent manner to the 
way in which Northern Ireland uses ‘fuel poverty’.  The notion of ‘poverty’ (embedded in the issue ‘fuel poverty’) 
also opens up conceptual complexities in its own right; see, e.g., Peter Townsend’s classic paper ‘The Meaning 
of Poverty’ (1962) 13 (3) The British Journal of Sociology, 210–217. 
11 Supra n.9 (FPMH), 2. 
12 Supra n.7 (AFPSR, 2018) p.84; and (AFPSR, 2017), 72. 
13 See further below. 
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the overall distribution of energy powers under the UK’s multi-level national/devolved power 
arrangements, Muinzer and Ellis have found that: 
 
Northern Ireland actually has the greatest extent of devolved powers, despite the fact 
that it is the smallest administration; Scotland has the largest share of renewable 
resources and has aspired to greater autonomy in the field of energy, yet it acts on a 
narrower formal legal basis; and Wales has a much more limited range of devolved 
energy powers.14 
The assertion in the AFPSR that fuel poverty is ‘a devolved issue’ was qualified in a more 
correct way in the 2016 version of the FPMH: “Fuel poverty is a partially devolved matter, 
with each separate administration having individual policy targets, measurement and 
outputs.”15  As just noted, this statement was conveyed with less accuracy in the version of the 
FPMH produced in the following years by BEIS.16  The FPMH (2016) has provided a ‘main 
reason’ underpinning this partial devolution: 
 
The main reason for the devolution is that the separate administrations have the power 
to affect certain aspects of fuel poverty policies (such as energy efficiency programs) 
but not others (such as incomes and market conditions, which impact fuel prices).17 
 
This statement is a little confused, insofar as it does not offer a ‘main reason’ for the devolution 
itself, but rather provides a recognition that powers pertaining to fuel poverty naturally cross-
cut a range of multi-level national/devolved governance competences.  This notion of ‘cross-
cutting’ will be more sharply clarified and deeply explored through the lens of the Energy 
Constitution below. 
 
Furthermore, the inaccuracy just noted in the AFPSR (2017 & 2018) – that “Fuel poverty is a 
devolved issue” – is further thrown into relief where one focuses on the UK’s substate level 
directly and hones in on the manner in which the UK’s Devolved Administrations are required 
to cross-connect their policy capacities in terms of practical governance.  Thus, taking this UK 
case study’s primary substate focal territory as an example, Northern Ireland, in Fuel Poverty 
in Northern Ireland, an important research document produced for the Northern Ireland 




14 Supra n.1 (Muinzer and Ellis), 1181. 
15 FPMH, 2016, (DECC: UK, 2016), 6. Emphasis added. 
16 The subsequent adjustment reads “Fuel poverty is a devolved matter”, supra n.9 (FPMH), 4. 
17 FPMH, 2016 (supra n.16), 6; the same words appeared at FPMH, 2017 (supra n.9), 4. 
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fuel poverty is an issue which is complex and multi-dimensional and cuts across many 
different Government Departments including for example, OFMdFM18; Social 
Development; Enterprise, Trade and Investment; and Health.19 
 
These observations highlight the challenge posed to coherent policy formulation in the area of 
fuel poverty by the “complex and multi-dimensional” crosscutting nature of pertinent 
governance powers and competences.  These sorts of statements do not, however, significantly 
enhance clarity by identifying, isolating, and qualifying the powers themselves.   
 
The following sections demonstrate how one can contribute to the shoring up of this type of 
gap in knowledge through the application of the ‘Energy Constitution’ framework.  Northern 
Ireland occupies a special indicative site of focus within the broader context of the UK case 
study, due to the unprecedented levels of fuel poverty that have predominated in the jurisdiction 
over recent years, and the pronounced technical challenges that arise there, including a 
significant degree of energy insecurity and a regional economy that is proportionally weaker 
than that of the UK’s other substate jurisdictions. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Framework: the ‘Energy Constitution’ 
 
Constitutionally, the UK is unusual, resembling Israel and New Zealand in that it “does not 
have a written constitution, ie a documentary or codified constitution”.20  Rather than being 
grounded in a key codified document, such as the US Constitution in the case of the USA, the 
UK constitution is instead manifest across a range of sources, including (but not limited to) 
Acts of UK Parliament, certain key court decisions, and various constitutional principles and 
conventions.21  The introduction of devolution in the UK in the late 1990s by Tony Blair’s 
Labour Government resulted in the creation of three new substate legislatures in this setting: 
the Northern Ireland Assembly; the Scottish Parliament; the National Assembly for Wales.22  
These major constitutional developments were accompanied by the creation of devolved 
Northern Irish and Scottish executive governments, and a roughly equivalent Welsh Executive 
Committee for Wales.23  These substate legislative and executive institutions, and the broader 
cumulative constitutional arrangements attaching to them (including partially differentiated 
 
18 That is, the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland.  In 2016 this was renamed 
the Executive Office. 
19 Fuel Poverty in Northern Ireland Research Paper 89/09 (Northern Ireland Assembly Research and Library 
Services: Northern Ireland, 2009), 1.  This quotation continues to appropriately capture the spirit of fuel 
poverty’s departmental cross-cutting nature in Northern Ireland, although some of Northern Ireland’s 
departments themselves have been reorganised since this statement was made. 
20 Neil Parpworth, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2014), 11. 
21 See further: Ibid (Parpworth ‘Sources of the UK Constitution’), 12 ; Jim Gallagher, ‘A New Constitution for the 
UK?’ LexisPSL, 06/01/2017 (unpaginated electronic publication). 
22 Noreen Burrows, Devolution (Sweet & Maxwell 2000). 
23 The Welsh Executive was a Committee of the Welsh Assembly until 2007, where it was separated out from 
the Assembly into a substate Welsh government that is roughly equivalent in form and nature to the Northern 
Irish and Scottish executive governments. 
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substate court systems), structure key capacities for action and agency amongst and between 
crucial actors in the sphere of energy governance, exerting in turn a powerful shaping influence 
on the relationships between national and substate multi-level decarbonisation processes.24  
 
In their ‘Mapping the Energy Constitution’ paper (2017),25 Muinzer and Ellis have explored 
the UK setting in order to generate an eponymous framework that provides “a detailed 
exploration of [the state’s] ‘Energy Constitution’ as a means of examining the way in which 
the complex legal framework of devolution shapes the spatial organisation of the UK’s low 
carbon transition.”26  In doing so, the authors have pointed out that: 
 
The UK has a ‘national’ strategy to decarbonise its energy sector, yet the transfer of 
key responsibilities to its Devolved Administrations has meant that they control many 
of the powers that determine the rate and extent of the decarbonisation process. This 
reflects an asymmetrical distribution of legal responsibilities that has cast a complex 
range of powers ‘downward’ from the national sphere to subnational scales and which 
plays a crucial role in shaping the agency at different levels of the UK’s energy 
governance.27 
Integrating work from Cowell et. al.,28 Muinzer and Ellis have stressed that:  
as Cowell et al have shown, the UK’s Devolved Administrations (Scotland, Wales, 
Northern Ireland) have played significant, and varied, roles in the development of 
renewable energy, although they have tended to adopt certain modes of governance 
shaped by working within – and sometimes despite – processes, targets and policies 
defined at the UK level.29 
The Energy Constitution framework emphasises how fundamental national/substate multi-
level decarbonisation relationships “are shaped by the UK’s constitutional arrangements, 
which have resulted in a patchwork of subnational jurisdictions imbued with a complex series 
 
24 Richard Cowell, Geraint Ellis, Fionnguala Sherry-Brennan, Peter A. Strachan and David Toke, ‘Rescaling the 
Governance of Renewable Energy: Lessons from the UK Devolution Experience (2017) 19 (5) Journal of 
Environmental Policy and Planning, 480–502. 
25 Supra n.1 (Muinzer and Ellis). 
26 Ibid (Muinzer and Ellis), 1176. 
27 Ibid (Muinzer and Ellis), 1177. 
28 Supra n.25, Cowell et al.; Richard Cowell, Geraint Ellis, Fionnguala Sherry-Brennan, Peter A Strachan and David 
Toke, ‘Energy transitions, sub-national government and regime flexibility: How has devolution in the United 
Kingdom affected renewable energy development?’ (2017) 23 Energy Research & Social Science, 169–181; 
Richard Cowell, Geraint Ellis, Fionnguala Sherry-Brennan, Peter A Strachan and David Toke, ‘Delivering 
Renewable Energy Under Devolution’ (DREUD: UK, 2013).  
29 Supra n.1 (Muinzer and Ellis), 1177.  Note that the devolved powers have been adjusted somewhat over time.  
In the case of Scotland, for example, see the revisions to the devolution arrangements under the Scotland Act 
2016; a useful analysis of the energy-specific consequences of these developments is provided in Gavin Little, 
‘Energy and the Scotland Act 2016’ (2016) 20 (3) Edinburgh Law Review, 394-399; see particularly pages 396 – 
397 on the (minor) additional powers devolved in relation to fuel poverty support systems.  The general 
principles behind the mapping of powers exercise remain sound and should be understood to generate a 
“snapshot” of the contemporary constitution when employed at a given time, due to the fact that the 
constitution will no doubt be subject to gradual change in future. 
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of asymmetric energy controls that frequently exhibit nuanced policy intentions.”30  It is further 
emphasised that “[d]espite the fact that these controls are determined by a range of formal legal 
instruments, debates over both the scale and (re-)territorialisation of decarbonisation processes 
in the UK have remained largely ‘lawless’”31 and, moreover, have “typically ignored the way” 
that “detailed constitutional… arrangements have defined the scope for agency and action.”32 
Thus, the form and influence of the underlying ‘Energy Constitution’, which has been left 
largely unexplored in the UK, can be drawn out by “examining the spatial and scalar 
distribution of powers related to decarbonisation,” which is achieved most particularly through 
a ‘Mapping of Powers’ element of Muinzer and Ellis’s study via “doctrinal legal analysis33 of 
how the law has defined the energy-related responsibilities of the Devolved Administrations 
and the impact this has on the energy governance”.34 
First, the framework ‘maps’ the UK’s full constitutional distribution of multi-level national and 
substate legislative powers that define and limit the scope for action and agency across the 
UK’s major tiers of governance: these can be found set out in full in Appendices to that paper.35  
Next, the technique exposes and critiques the energy-specific powers and controls that can be 
identified amongst this overall power nexus, thereby throwing into relief the primary elements 
underpinning the ‘Energy Constitution’ in the UK.36  The findings demonstrate how “debates 
about ‘the right scale’ of action tend to overlook the underlying complexities of energy 
governance and often project a level of sovereignty and agency that cannot be sustained under 
detailed examination, with legal responsibilities rarely being able to be isolated to a single scale 
or having clear boundaries.”37  
In addition to identifying and mapping the political-legal fields of competence apportioned 
across these multi-levels by the state’s latent uncodified constitutional arrangements in the 
fashion just mentioned, the conceptual framework also asserts that these multi-level 
governance capacities and restrictions are impacted and moderated by a series of active and 
inextricable principles and technical constraints.  Taking the aforementioned principles first, 
 
30 Ibid (Muinzer and Ellis), 1177.  See also Rosanne Palmer, Devolution, Asymmetry and Europe: Multi-level 
Governance in the United Kingdom (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008).  
31 Ibid (Muinzer and Ellis), 1177; drawing on David Delaney, ’Legal geography – Constitutivities, complexities, 
and contingencies’ (2015) 39 (1) Progress in Human Geography, 96–102.  See ibid (Delaney), 97.  
32 Ibid (Muinzer and Ellis), 1177.  Drawing on Turner: Sharon Turner, ‘Northern Ireland’s consent to the Climate 
Change Act 2008: Symbol or illusion?’ (2013) 25 (1) Journal of Environmental Law, 63  63; Sharon Turner, 
‘Committing to effective climate governance in Northern Ireland: A defining test of devolution’ (2013) 25 (2) 
Journal of Environmental Law, 203–234. 
33 On doctrinal legal analysis, see further Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds.) Research Methods for Law 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 18-21; and Aulis Aarnio Essays on the Doctrinal Study of Law 
(London: Springer, 2011) 19-26. 
34 Supra n.1 (Muinzer and Ellis), 1177. 
35 Ibid (Muinzer and Ellis), ‘Appendix’, 1194-1197.  
36 Most particularly over ibid (Muinzer and Ellis), 1180-1186, ‘The UK’s “Energy Constitution”: Mapping the 
Powers’. 
37 Ibid (Muinzer and Ellis), 1180.  Building on insights raised in Benda-Beckmann F von, Benda-Beckmann K von 
and A Griffiths, ‘Space and legal pluralism’ In: Spatializing Law: An Anthropological Geography of Law in Society 
(Oxon, England: Ashgate, 2013), 1–29. 
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these can be divided into two key principles as follows: 
• Principle 1 =  The recognition and qualification that identifiable devolved/national 
powers appear to be relatively clear-cut and rigid, e.g., the (correct) assertion that 
‘energy’ competence is devolved to Northern Ireland38; however, the powers are 
in actuality fuzzy and slightly indeterminate, and as such a particular competence 
may not only be difficult to define in precise terms, but may likely overlap with 
other competences to some extent.39 
 
Muinzer and Ellis have generated three key assumptions from these circumstances:  
 
The key points here are threefold:  
 
firstly, it is often difficult to gauge in legal terms where precisely the fuzzy 
dividing lines between particular devolved-reserved powers are to begin and 
end;  
 
secondly, and as with other areas of law, core legislative provisions can be 
dynamically interpreted by the courts;  
 
and thirdly, given that the UK’s ‘Energy Constitution’ is geographically 
differentiated, such case law will inevitably reflect the wider socio-spatial 
context of devolution.40 
 
• Principle 2 = Notwithstanding the fuzzy or semi-indeterminate nature of a given 
national or devolved power (per the previous principle), the additional assertion 
that identifiable national/substate powers are subject to particular special 
conditions/qualifications applicable within the broader framework of those 
powers.   These conditions are active where powers may be hollowed out to some 
extent, or cut into / cut away by associated powers.   
 
As an example of the ‘hollowing out’ of a power, it is the case that ‘energy’ competence 
is devolved to Northern Ireland41; however, within that devolved competence, ‘nuclear 
energy’ is excepted, that is to say, it is not devolved under the terms of the pertinent 
constitutional legislation, such that Northern Ireland’s devolved ‘energy’ competence 
is partially hollowed out as a consequence of these restrictions on nuclear energy 
 
38 See further Section 4 below, where Northern Ireland’s competences are examined. 
39 Consequently, the Energy Constitution framework accords a particular degree of significance to courts of law, 
insofar as courts can be called upon to establish more precise parameters around particular devolved/national 
competences when called on to do so: see, e.g., the following court case, involving Scottish reserved/devolved 
powers, Imperial Tobacco Limited v The Lord Advocate (Scotland) [2012] UKSC 61. 
40 Supra n.1 (Muinzer and Ellis), 1188.  
41 Energy is a ‘transferred’ matter in accordance with the Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.4; see further Section 4 
below. 
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control.42   
 
As an example of powers being ‘cut into’ / ‘cut away’ by associated competences, it 
has just been noted that ‘energy’ is devolved to Northern Ireland; however, ‘taxes’ are 
reserved to national Parliament,43 that is to say, they are not devolved.  Given that tax 
powers are frequently used to create economic mechanisms that will incentivise energy 
decarbonisation, it is the case that aspects of the facility to act in the area of energy at 
the Northern Irish level are cut into or cut away by the tax reservation.  In other words, 
although on the face of things this reservation concerns a distinct non-energy 
competence, nevertheless it removes some agency to act in the sphere of energy 
subnationally, in spite of the fact that ‘energy’ itself as a competence is devolved to 
Northern Ireland. 
Coming now to the technical constraints mentioned above, which serve to moderate the 
operation of multi-level governance capacities and restrictions that are identified when 
political-legal capacities are ‘mapped’ across the national and substate levels, these are mostly 
of a technical legal nature.  Their presence is dictated by the reality that the operation of the 
UK’s constitutional machinery is governed by constitutional law.  In order to apply the 
conceptual framework to useful ends, it is enough that these major technical constraints are 
recognised and acknowledged, such that they contribute to and qualify the overall picture 
provided by the Energy Constitution.  Although the following list is not exhaustive,44 the major 
technical constraints operating here within the Energy Constitution framework paradigm are 
as follows: 
• The function of executive devolution.  It is legislative devolution that is directly 
engaged in the ‘mapping of powers’ exercise itself, because executive devolution 
cannot be mapped in the same coherent way from the fundamental constitutional 
legislation.  Yet executive devolution is a pertinent, active feature of the UK 
constitution that is in operation and that therefore should be understood to impact and 
qualify the overall picture provided by the Energy Constitution. 
 
Parpworth clarifies the distinction between ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ devolution as 
follows: 
 
‘devolution’ taken in a broad conceptual sense ‘may involve the transfer of 
functions from central government to a subordinate executive in addition to or 
as an alternative to the transfer of legislative power from one Parliament to 
another. In other words, devolution may be ‘‘executive’, ‘‘legislative’’, or 
 
42 This nuclear exception is expressed in the legislation as “[n]uclear energy and nuclear installations, including 
nuclear safety, security and safeguards, and liability for nuclear occurrences”; Northern Ireland Act 1998, 
Schedule 2.18. 
43 Northern Ireland Act 1998, Schedule 2.9. 
44 For example, see the paragraph immediately after this indented list, where it is also noted that constitutions 
normally confer direct ‘rights’ on citizens, and as such a rights-based schema can be interpreted as acting as a 
shaping influence in the context of the powers identified under the Energy Constitution mapping exercise. 
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both”’[.] 45 
 
• The operation of legislative consent motions (also known in the UK as the ‘Sewel 
convention’). 
 
Muinzer and Ellis summarise this feature of the Energy Constitution as follows: 
 
[A] legislative consent motion… dictates that a provision of a Westminster Act 
that intrudes upon an area of devolved competence will extend to the pertinent 
devolved jurisdiction only where the Devolved Assembly has passed a motion 
consenting to the arrangement[.]46 
Importantly, the authors also stress that: “these consent motions embody an agreement 
between national Parliament and the devolved institutions”.47  This means that although 
legislative consent motions are an applied constitutional practice, national Parliament 
can technically over-ride a substate Parliament in an instance where that substate 
Parliament will not consent to national Parliament’s intrusion on its devolved energy 
(or other) powers. 
 
• Special arrangements or agreements arising from the structure of 
national/devolved structure of UK governance that Richard Rawlings has 
summatively described as ‘new style pseudo-contracts’ / ‘a raft of inter-
institutional administrative agreements’.48 In the UK these include things like the 
important Memorandum of Understanding on Devolution.49  Muinzer and Ellis 
summarise that this Memorandum, and other agreements like it, are formal agreements 
that “provide a basis for how the Devolved Administrations and UK Government 
conduct relations with one another (in areas including communication, consultation, 
information exchange, etc.)”.50  More broadly, this field of ‘special arrangements or 
agreements’ can be widened out to include any form of ‘soft law’ that compliments the 
body of ‘hard law’ containing the powers that are ‘mapped out’ under the Energy 
Constitution (and any equivalent examples of pertinent hard law, such as the Human 
Rights Act 1998 mentioned in the following paragraph).51 
 
45 Discussed in Supra n.1 (Muinzer and Ellis), 1188, drawing on Parpworth’s summary clarification of the 
distinction between legislative and executive devolution in Neil Parpworth, Constitutional and Administrative 
Law (8th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 161-162. 
46 Supra n.1 (Muinzer and Ellis), 1180. 
47 Ibid (Muinzer and Ellis), 1180-1181. 
48 See Richard Rawlings,  ‘Concordats of the constitution’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review, 257–286.  
49 Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements Between the United Kingdom Government, 
the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, the Northern Ireland Executive Committee (UK Government, 2013).  
50 Supra n.1 (Muinzer and Ellis), 1181. 
51 As discussed at Ibid (Muinzer and Ellis), 1181. 
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The Energy Constitution also encourages the analyst to acknowledge and consider the role and 
presence of rights and equity in relation to a given energy issue (here, fuel poverty).  This is 
chiefly due to the fact that constitutions normally grant equitable rights to individual citizens, 
namely, human rights and associated protections and entitlements.  The UK’s Human Rights 
Act 1998, for example, is a major explicit source of individual rights in the UK.  The Energy 
Constitution invites the question as to how or to what extent such constitutional rights may/may 
not impact or moderate particular aspects of multi-level energy entitlements within the broader 
context of the state’s framing of public and private powers.  
 
3. Fuel Poverty, Northern Ireland and UK Substate Divergence 
 
Subnational regional differences have a substantial ability to affect and influence fuel poverty.  
For much of this study’s preparation period, Northern Ireland was on record as having the 
highest rates of fuel poverty in the UK according to the latest available statistics.  These had 
not been updated since 2011’s figures, sitting at an astonishing 42% of Northern Irish 
households in fuel poverty for 2011.52  The figures were finally updated by a report released 
on 31 May 2018, which reported for 2016.  According to the new figures the 42% level for 
2011 has improved to 22% for 2016 (see further below).53 
 
Northern Ireland is presently undergoing a challenging and somewhat unstable ‘post-Troubles 
transition’ after years of civil unrest and violence, and it is also the least developed region of 
the UK, with the weakest economy.  As such, it is notable that it has been emphasised in the 
Northern Irish context that home-improvements to an energy inefficient home, such as the 
installation of central heating, will not necessarily be enough to remedy fuel poverty in certain 
individual cases, given that a sustained low income may cause fuel poverty to persist 
regardless.54  Liddell, Morris, McKenzie and Rae have also clarified that “Whilst there are 
three classic causes of fuel poverty (energy efficiency of building fabric, income, and price of 
domestic fuels), fuel poverty in Northern Ireland has been driven prominently by the price of 
heating oil, and more recently by volatility in the price of gas.”55  Indeed, setting the issue of 
the strength of the Northern Irish economy aside and taking energy costs in isolation, it remains 
 
52 Annual Fuel Poverty Statistics Report, 2014 (Crown: UK, 2014), 62. 
53 Healy and Clinch have clarified and emphasised that fuel poverty is also a troubling issue below the Northern 
Irish border in the Republic of Ireland: see e.g., Peter J Clinch and John D. Healy, Alleviating fuel poverty in 
Ireland: a program for the 21st century (University College Dublin, Department of Environmental Studies, 1999), 
2.  See further: John D Healy and Peter J. Clinch ‘Quantifying the severity of fuel poverty, its relationship with 
poor housing and reasons for non-investment in energy-saving measures in Ireland’ (2004) 32.2 Energy Policy, 
207-220; John D. Healy and Peter J. Clinch, ‘Fuel poverty, thermal comfort and occupancy: results of a national 
household-survey in Ireland’ (2002) 73.3-4 Applied Energy, 329-343.  See also Sue Scott, Sean Lyons, Claire 
Keane, Donal McCarthy and Richard S. J. Tol, ‘Fuel poverty in Ireland: Extent, affected groups and policy issues’ 
ESRI working paper (2008, No. 262)..   
54 Niamh Shortt and Jorun Rugkåsa, ‘”The walls were so damp and cold” fuel poverty and ill health in Northern 
Ireland: results from a housing intervention’  (2007) 13.1 Health & Place, 99-110. 
55 Christine Liddell, Chris Morris, Paul McKenzie and Gordon Rae, “Defining Fuel Poverty in Northern Ireland: a 
preliminary review”, Department for Social Development in Northern Ireland, 2011, 6. 
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the case that “excessively high fuel prices in Northern Ireland have meant that a very large 
number of households are still in fuel poverty.”56  Further regional features also exert formative 
influences in this respect.  For example, it has been stated that:  
[t]he level and depth of fuel poverty is… greater for households not connected to the 
gas grid.  …Households classified as ‘rural’ have a much higher proportion of 
households that are not connected to the gas grid, and therefore, a higher level and depth 
of fuel poverty.57 
 
These correlations have been flagged up over the course of statistical analysis pertaining to 
England, however it is notable that Northern Ireland has a proportionately high rural 
community, and gas grid connection is frequently less developed than elsewhere in the UK.58   
 
Northern Ireland has also been troubled in particular by a heavy reliance on oil, usually much 
higher in price than gas.  These sorts of circumstances can pose entrenched challenges for fuel 
poverty mitigation.59  In March 2017 the Housing Executive in Northern Ireland published 
preliminary findings from the Northern Ireland House Condition Survey 2016 (NIHCS 2016).60  
The NIHCS 2016 objectives as stated included “[t]o provide a reliable assessment of the energy 
efficiency of the stock and the level of Fuel Poverty in Northern Ireland on a comparable basis 
with the rest of the UK.”61  Disappointingly, this preliminary report scarcely touched on fuel 
poverty, and it was hoped that the main report to follow would bring Northern Ireland’s 
calcified 2011 statistics (noted above) more up to speed with the rest of the UK.   
 
This finally occurred with the release on 31 May 2018 of the Northern Ireland House Condition 
Survey Main Report 2016 (NIHCSMP 2016).62  Using a 10% fuel poverty measurement 
indicator,63 the report found that in 2016 “approximately 22% (160,000) of households in 
Northern Ireland were in fuel poverty”, meaning that this “represents a significant improvement 
 
56 Maggie Davidson, Simon Nicol, Mike Roys, Helen Garrett, Adele Beaumont and Charlotte Turner, The Cost of 
Poor Housing in Northern Ireland (BRE: UK, 2012), 1. 
57 Supra n.7 (AFPSR, 2016), 25. 
58 Using sophisticated modelling, Walker, Liddell, McKenzie and Morris have found significant geographic 
disparity in the rate and cost of home retrofits in Northern Ireland, although they also find evidence that rural 
areas may be better served by policy than might have been expected based on existing expectations, see: Ryan 
Walker, Christine Liddell, Paul McKenzie and Chris Morris, ‘Evaluating fuel poverty policy in Northern Ireland 
using a geographic approach’ (2013) 63 Energy Policy, 765-774.  For insightful exploration of fuel poverty in the 
context of UK urban/rural divides, see Deborah Roberts,  Esperanza Vera-Toscano, and Euan Phimister, ‘Fuel 
poverty in the UK: Is there a difference between rural and urban areas?’(2015) 87(C) Energy Policy, 216-223. 
59 For novel analysis of what the authors call a ‘boundary spanner’ approach to tacking fuel poverty in rural 
Northern Ireland, which seems to hold a facility to yield impressive results, see Jorun Rugkåsa, Niamh K. Shortt 
and Leslie Boydell, ‘The right tool for the task: “boundary spanners” in a partnership approach to tackle fuel 
poverty in rural Northern Ireland’ (2007) 15.3 Health & Social Care in the Community, 221-230. 
60 Northern Ireland Housing Executive, House Condition Survey, Preliminary Report 2016 (NIE: Northern Ireland, 
2017), 3. 
61 Ibid (Northern Ireland Housing Executive, Preliminary Report), 9. 
62 Northern Ireland Housing Executive, House Condition Survey, Main Report (NIE: Northern Ireland, 2018). 
63 Measurement indicators are discussed below. 
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in fuel poverty levels since 2011 when the figure was 42% (294,000).”64  The 20 percentage 
points decrease is attributable to a number of factors, most importantly “lower average fuel 
prices, lower modelled household energy use (mainly due to improved energy efficiency of the 
stock, particularly dwelling fabric and heating systems) and increased income.”65  As the 
AFPSR (2018) points out, one reason for the improvement that is directly attributable to the 
Devolved Administration itself is that “[t]he [Northern Ireland] Executive focused on removing 
poor energy efficiency as one of the causes of fuel poverty 2011-2016.”66  Thus, the NIHCSMP 
2016 emphasises that targeted strategic “investment by government in domestic energy 
efficiency schemes of over £117 million in the private sector and £181 million in Housing 
Executive stock” has taken place over 2011-2016, which has “made a contribution to reducing 
domestic energy consumption and thus fuel poverty levels.”67 
 
In sum, Northern Ireland stands apart from the UK’s other substate jurisdictions somewhat.  
This includes through the extent to which Northern Ireland had been subject to a radically high 
level of fuel poverty (42%) according to the most recent available reports that had preceded 
the NIHCSMP report of May 2018, with the latter report indicating that this major problem is 
at last being brought under at least some degree of meaningful control (currently at 22%). 
 
Situating Northern Ireland within the UK more broadly, the UK’s cumulative substate picture 
is complicated by regional economic and geographic (climactic) disparities and variations, 
which render elusive any sense of precise comparison between households in each substate 
jurisdiction.  Writing in 2012, Liddell, Morris, McKenzie and Rae have noted that: 
 
prevalence of fuel poverty has always been higher outside of England. In 2009, 18% of 
English households were in fuel poverty, compared with 26% in Wales, 33% in 
Scotland, and 44% in Northern Ireland. …[I]n Northern Ireland… households spend 
almost 1.5 times as much of their income on heat, power and light as do English 
households.68 
They add that: 
The greater cost of heating and lighting in Northern Ireland is attributable to several 
factors. The region has a colder climate, requiring 20% more heating in an average year 
than does London; oil-fired heating systems also predominate, and (in April 2011) these 
cost 68% more than gas to produce a therm of domestic heat; electricity is also more 
 
64 Supra n.61 (NIHCSMP 2016) 15. However, note also that at the very recent time of writing on 9 April 2019 
Estimated Fuel Poverty Figures for 2017-2018 based on modelling were published by the Northern Ireland 
Housing Executive in the report ‘Estimates of Fuel Poverty in Northern Ireland 2017 and 2018’ (Housing 
Executive, 9 April 2019).  While the outcomes are only indicative estimates, it is reported that the 2018 estimate 
shows that “a small rise in the level of fuel poverty in Northern Ireland relative to 2016” has since been occurring 
due to electricity price rises (quoting ibid. p.8). 
65 Ibid (NIHCSMP 2016) 15. 
66 Supra n.7 (AFPSR, 2018) 85. 
67 Supra n.61 (NIHCSMP 2016) 15. 
68 Christine Liddell et al., ‘Measuring and monitoring fuel poverty in the UK: National and regional perspectives’ 
(2012) 49 Energy Policy 27-32, 30. 
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expensive in the region[.]69 
Given the ‘asymmetric’ nature of devolution,70 that is, where devolved powers and capacities 
frequently differ across Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (England is governed from 
national Parliament71), this creates an inherent capacity for substantial differentiation between 
the energy-related powers allocated to each devolved region under the terms of the Energy 
Constitution (see Section 4 below). Thus, it is unsurprising to find that the policy experience 
across these jurisdictions has diverged somewhat.  Unlike Northern Ireland, the UK’s other 
substate jurisdictions have tended toward adopting statutory targets for fuel poverty72  The 
AFPSR has noted that “Scotland and Wales have targets and set policies to tackle the issue” of 
fuel poverty that differ from the Northern Irish policy approach.73  However, and what is 
perhaps more unusual, is that the devolved divergences have also resulted in different 
definitional and methodological approaches to the actual measurement of fuel poverty.  In 
particular, and as the AFPSR has pointed out, “each nation in the UK ha[s] its own fuel poverty 
definition”.74  This definitional divergence has the effect of meaning that one cannot 
conveniently and directly aggregate Northern Irish, Scottish, Welsh and English fuel poverty 
measures in order to produce one overall ‘whole picture’ of the UK experience75; one cannot 
do so due to the fact that the definitional and methodological approach to measurement is not 
standardised across the jurisdictions.76 
 




69 Ibid (Liddell), 30. 
70 Asymmetry and associated devolution issues are raised insightfully in the context of (Welsh) energy policy in 
Stevie Upton, ‘The Devolution Settlement and Energy Policy in Wales: Reflections on some Critical Issues’ (2014) 
27 (1) Contemporary Wales, 105–126. 
71 For an overview of law-making in the UK, see Robert Hazell and Richard Rawlings (eds.), Devolution, Law 
Making and the Constitution (UK: Imprint Academic; issued on digital publication by Andrews UK Limited, 2015). 
72 A sense of Northern Ireland’s overall strategic approach to fuel poverty is provided in Warmer Healthier 
Homes: A New Fuel Poverty Strategy for Northern Ireland (Department for Social Development: Northern 
Ireland, 2011).  
73 Supra n.7 (AFPSR, 2016), 23.  See also Supra n.7: AFPSR, 2017, 72; AFPSR, 2018, 84. 
74 Supra n.7 (AFPSR, 2017), 72 and (AFPSR, 2018),84. 
75 Much research exists on how fuel poverty can be best defined, see e.g., Moore’s ‘Definitions of Fuel Poverty’, 
which includes an explanation of the merits of a ‘budget standard’ approach that factors minimum income 
standards into fuel poverty measurement calculations: Richard Moore, ‘Definitions of fuel poverty: Implications 
for policy’" (2012) 49 Energy Policy, 19-26.  On measurement issues, see also e.g., Ryan Walker, Paul McKenzie, 
Christine Liddell and Chris Morris, ‘Estimating fuel poverty at household level: An integrated approach’ (2014) 
80Energy and Buildings, 469-479.  Defining Fuel Poverty In Northern Ireland: A Preliminary Review addresses the 
definition of fuel poverty in great detail in the Northern Irish context, and posits sophisticated improvements 
that the authors suggest can better represent the problem: Supra n.56 (Liddell), Section 2, 53–120. 
76 Thus, artificial adjustments are required.  Note also that although Northern Ireland employs a 10% fuel poverty 
measure (see below), the most recent Northern Irish fuel poverty report has also included England-style “LIHC” 
calculations (also discussed below) for the first time: see further the NIHCSMP 2016, at Supra n.61.  This means 
Northern Irish fuel poverty rates can be more easily compared with England’s rates. 
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Due to both definition and methodological differences in fuel poverty for each devolved 
nation, the figures are non-additive (i.e. should not be combined) in relation to a UK 
total.77 
 
Hence the particular importance of the FPMH – the handbook dealing with methodology – 
flagged up above.  As outlined in the Table appended to this paper,78 Scotland and Wales use 
(unstandardised) percentage indicators79 to gauge fuel poverty levels, England uses what is 
known as a Low Income High Costs (‘LIHC’) indicator, and Northern Ireland uses a 
Scotland/Wales style percentage indicator (although Northern Ireland has also integrated the 
English LIHC into its reporting for the first time recently80).  England’s LIHC indicator is 
outlined in the following terms: 
 
Under the LIHC indicator, a household is considered to be fuel poor if: 
 
• they have required fuel costs that are above average (the national median level).  
• were they to spend that amount, they would be left with a residual income below 
the official poverty line.81 
 
The “LIHC definition is a relative indicator as it compares households to the national median 
fuel costs and income – thereby reflecting contemporary trends.”82  England had until relatively 
recently taken a 10% definition approach to fuel poverty resembling the (unstandardized) 
Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish 10%.  Reduced to its essentials, this type of approach 
recognises a household to be in fuel poverty where 10% or more of its income is spent on fuel 
needs.  An independent review led by Professor Sir John Hills and published in 2012 advised 
the government to employ (amongst other things) a differing model that included calculation 
of both the extent and the depth of fuel poverty.83  Here, the ‘extent’ of the problem can be 
defined as “how many fuel poor households there are”84 and the ‘depth’ of the problem can be 
defined as “how badly affected each fuel poor household is”.85  After a consultation period the 
new Hills approach was phased in for England.  The LIHC model has some clear merits in that 
it presents a richer picture of fuel poverty circumstances, for example capturing the ‘depth’ of 
the problem in a way that a flat 10% indicator does not do.  It also contains some demerits in 
that it is more convoluted than the previous approach, and in the broader context of the multi-
 
77 Supra  n.7 (AFPSR, 2018), 85; Supra n.7, (AFPSR, 2017), 72; and Supra n.7, (AFPSR, 2016), 24. 
78 See ‘Table, with Key’, below.  
79 The indicators are ‘unstandardised’ in the sense that the devolved jurisdictions do not use identical means to 
calculate their percentages; see ‘Table, with Key’, below.  
80 See the NIHCSMP 2016 report, at Supra n.61. 
81 Supra n.7 (AFPSR, 2018, 6; AFPSR, 2017, 6; AFPSR, 2016, 6–7). 
82 Supra n.9 (FPMH), 1.  For more detail on the LIHC indicator see FPMH Chapter 6. 
83 John Hills, Getting the Measure of Fuel Poverty, Final Report of the Fuel Poverty Review (DECC: London, 2012). 
84 Supra n.7 (AFPSR, 2017), 6. 
85 Ibid, (AFPSR, 2017), 6.  More particularly, “the depth of fuel poverty is represented by the ‘fuel poverty gap’.  
This is defined as the amount by which the assessed energy needs of fuel poor households exceed the threshold 
for reasonable costs.”  Supra n.9 (FPMH), 63, emphasis added. 
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level Energy Constitution setting it more heavily distorts a capacity to generalise across the 
substate vista due to the lack of similitude between the traditional Northern Irish, Scottish and 
Welsh 10% indicators and the current developed English approach.86   
 
[FIGURE 1 APPEARS – PLEASE REFER TO THE DOCUMENT CONTAINING 
FIGURES/TABLES PROVIDED WITH THIS SUBMISSION, PER HOUSE STYLE 
REQUIREMENTS] 
 
Source: Fuel Poverty Methodology Handbook (BEIS: UK, 2017), 2.87 
 
Amongst Northern Ireland’s relatively limited body of government documents engaging fuel 
poverty, it has been stated that:  
 
In broad terms the same definition of fuel poverty has been adopted by both the UK 
Government and the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales.  In Northern Ireland, the definition of fuel poverty is set out in the Northern 
Ireland Fuel Poverty Strategy, ‘Ending Fuel Poverty: A Strategy for Northern Ireland’, 
which states that:  
 
‘a household is in fuel poverty if, in order to maintain an acceptable level of 
temperature throughout the home, the occupants would have to spend more than 
10% of their income on all household fuel use[.]88 
 
It is clear from the commentary above that the implication here that ‘the same definition of fuel 
poverty’ has been rolled out across the UK is somewhat misleading.89 
 
The Energy Constitution framework has been sketched out under heading 2 above.  Under this 
third heading consideration has been afforded to Northern Ireland’s fuel poverty circumstances, 
and certain important asymmetric elements manifest within the UK’s substate setting in 
relation to fuel poverty have also been highlighted, in particular concerning definitional and 
methodological issues.  The unfolding analysis is now well placed to situate fuel poverty more 
directly within the context of section 2’s Energy Constitution framework, in order to better 
elucidate capacities for action and areas of constraint running across and between the UK’s 
national and devolved multi-levels of governance.  This is undertaken in the following section. 
 
86 As noted above (n.73; see also the Table appended to this paper), the last major reporting round in Northern 
Ireland included LIHC readings for the first time.  The AFPSR, 2018 results for Northern Ireland are set out and 
correlated with England at Supra n.7, AFPSR 2018, 85. 
87 The official fuel poverty statistics themselves provide generalised and indicative data.  The statistics are 
generalised insofar as they do not pinpoint specific households; and they are indicative in the sense that they 
indicate extant levels of fuel poverty with a reasonable degree of accuracy, but without pin-point accuracy or 
statistical certainty.  The table above appears in virtually identical form in the more recent FPMH, 2018 (see 
page 2), but the 2017 version is reproduced here because it includes a little more information within the table 
border. 
88 Supra n.20 (Fuel Poverty in Northern Ireland), 1. Emphasis added. 
89 See further the Table at the end of this paper (‘Table, with Key’). 
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4. The Energy Constitution and Northern Ireland 
 
In terms of ‘mapping’ key pin-pointed legislative energy powers onto the UK’s conceptual 
national and substate levels,90 Cowell et al. have calculated for Northern Ireland at the substate 
level as follows: ‘energy policy’ is ‘fully devolved’; ‘planning and consents (onshore)’ are 
‘fully devolved’; ‘planning and consents (offshore)’ are mostly ‘fully devolved’; and the 
associated field of ‘economic development spending’ is ‘fully devolved’.91  Application of the 
Energy Constitution framework makes it possible to sharpen and develop these useful findings 
with greater accuracy. Northern Ireland’s governance powers are articulated most directly in 
law in an important constitutional statute, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (hereafter NIA 1998).  
The NIA 1998 establishes the key arrangements for devolving particular ‘matters’ to Northern 
Ireland, and recognises that the Northern Ireland Assembly has ‘legislative competence’ to 
legislate on these matters.92  The matters are construed in the legislation as ‘transferred’ 
matters,93 which are devolved, ‘reserved’ matters, where the Assembly can only legislate in 
these areas if it has received the permission of the Secretary of State,94 and ‘excepted’ matters,95 
which are withheld to the national level.   
Schedule 2 to the NIA 1998 specifies excepted matters96 and Schedule 3 specifies reserved 
matters,97 doing so in a technical legalistic way, and the legislation creates a rule that if matters 
do not appear as being expressly excepted or reserved then they are to be interpreted as being 
devolved.98  ‘Energy’ is excluded from Schedules 2 and 3; as such, it does not appear as an 
expressly excepted or reserved matter, and in accordance with the rule just stated, ‘energy’ is 
therefore to be interpreted as a transferred/devolved competence.  Bearing in mind both the 
‘fuzzy’ / potentially overlapping edges of powers and the capacity for powers to ‘cut into’ one 
another under the Energy Constitution (as outlined above), Muinzer and Ellis have identified 
and flagged up additional competences that are absent from the Schedules (ie., they are 
devolved to Northern Ireland) that have a particularly notable impact on energy competence.  
These include planning powers, aspects of utility regulation and housing.99  The fact that these 
powers can be mapped to Northern Ireland at the substate level bolsters Northern Ireland’s 
 
90 The expression ‘substate level’ or equivalent that is employed in this paper is also often described as the 
‘subnational level’ in the context of political science, most particularly multi-level governance analysis, see e.g., 
Kirsten Jorgensen, Anu Jogesh and Arabinda Mishra, ‘Multi-level Climate Governance and the Role of the 
Subnational Level’ (2015) 12 (4) Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences, 235–245. 
91 See the Table entitled ‘Table I. Devolution of energy-related powers in the UK’ in Cowell et. al. at Supra n.25 
(‘Rescaling the Governance of Renewable Energy’). 
92 NIA 1998, section 6. 
93 NIA 1998, section 4(1). 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 NIA 1998, Schedule 2. 
97 NIA 1998, Schedule 3. 
98 NIA 1998, section 4. 
99 Discussed Supra n.1 (Muinzer and Ellis), 1184. 
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capacity to engage in energy governance. 
Certain other significant powers, however, must be mapped to the national level rather than to 
Northern Ireland at the substate level, because they can be identified explicitly as being under 
national control.  Firstly, in terms of the concepts of the hollowing out and cutting into of 
competences under the Energy Constitution framework (outlined above), the hollowing out 
phenomenon is detectable: most particularly, Northern Ireland’s devolved energy competence 
is hollowed out to a partial degree through competence pertaining to ‘nuclear energy’ and 
nuclear power stations being withheld to the national level.100  Secondly, a degree of cutting 
into Northern Ireland’s energy competence by competences located at the national level is also 
detectible, which further limits Northern Ireland’s substate governance space under the Energy 
Constitution.  Thus, ‘taxes’ and ‘duties’ are withheld from Northern Ireland,101 and therefore 
must be mapped to the national level.  Given that taxes and duties have a capacity to be applied 
to the energy sector in order to steer the energy market or affect consumer behavioural change 
(taxes), and to moderate fuel import / export costs (duties), these powers cut into Northern 
Ireland’s substate capacity for agency in the field of energy.  Similarly, ‘international relations’ 
are excepted,102 further cutting into Northern Irish competence by restricting the Northern 
Ireland Assembly from legislating autonomously in areas engaging international climate and 
energy agreements, etc.  The detectible cutting in effect also incorporates restrictions on 
Northern Ireland’s direct relations with the EU / supranational institutions, which are similarly 
scaled to the national level and include energy-specific EU matters.103 
These findings expose key elements of the essential ‘backdrop’ of agency and constraint acting 
on the issue of fuel poverty in Northern Ireland under the terms of the Energy Constitution, 
however in order to apply the framework more acutely it is necessary to embed the issue of 
fuel poverty within the Energy Constitution’s power nexus in a narrower way.  Where one does 
situate fuel poverty within the framework of these powers, it becomes evident that Northern 
Ireland enjoys at least some degree of broad competence to act in the area of fuel poverty, 
insofar as fuel poverty is an energy-oriented issue and ‘energy’ competence is devolved.  As 
noted above, Cowell et al. have emphasised that ‘economic development spending’ is also 
devolved,104 providing, e.g., some facility for Northern Ireland to target monies funnelled down 
from the EU towards fuel poverty problems; see for instance Laurentis et al. on how “[a]cessing 
European resources has… been important to the evolution of Arbed”,105 a Welsh domestic 
housing retrofit programme intended to reduce fuel poverty in Wales.106  Similarly, there is 
scope to alleviate fuel poverty by channelling relief monies or associated spending from 
 
100 This occurs at NIA 1998, Schedule 2.18. 
101 NIA 1998, Schedule 2.9. 
102 NIA 1998, Schedule 2.3. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Supra n.92 and text to note. 
105 Carla De Laurentis, Malcolm Eames, and Miriam Hunt, ‘Retrofitting the built environment “to save” energy: 
Arbed, the emergence of a distinctive sustainability transition pathway in Wales’ (2017) 35.7 Environment and 
Planning C: Politics and Space 1156, 1167. 
106 See generally ibid (Laurentis et al). 
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Northern Ireland’s block grant into fuel poverty solutions, possibly relating (but not necessarily 
restricted) to the improvement of energy efficiency in building stock.107 
 
Such efforts can only be complimented by Northern Ireland’s devolved housing powers 
(identified as being scaled to Northern Ireland in the mapping above).  If housing powers were 
retained to the national level, a lack of competence in this area could cut into the devolved 
capacity for energy action in this sphere, including energy efficiency improvements and 
retrofitting, and thus act as a governance obstacle.  Northern Ireland’s devolved planning 
powers (identified above) can also be interpreted as creating constitutional space in the sphere 
of fuel poverty: e.g., they can be leveraged conceivably to shape outcomes geared towards 
securing greater energy efficiency in building stock and associated obligations as part of the 
planning consents procedure.108  In spite, then, of the hollowing out and cutting in concepts 
operationalised under the terms of the Energy Constitution, which significantly dent Northern 
Ireland’s overall capacity for substate agency, Northern Ireland is far from an impotent 
jurisdiction in the sphere of fuel poverty, and it is by no means compelled to passively follow 
an agenda set from ‘above’ at the national level under the terms of the Energy Constitution’s 
distribution of power capacities.  Given this broad power remit, it is advisable that the Northern 
Irish governance institutions recognise their extensive capacities for agency in this area, with 
a view to engaging in progressive governance that is as actively driven as possible by the 
Northern Irish administration in the interest of mitigating regional fuel poverty.  It has been 
noted above that the 42% fuel poverty figure that persisted for Northern Irish households in 
recent years has lately been significantly reduced.  Research has highlighted that Northern 
Ireland’s major governance actors have a tendency towards passively following nationally-led 
energy policy programmes, and are subject to something of a culture of energy policy 
“inertia”.109  Testing the extent to which the recent success in reducing the 42% fuel poverty 
figure was driven in practice by primarily national or primarily substate action is beyond the 
scope of this paper, however it is clear that the capacity to drive a progressive substate agenda 
exists in principle (as demonstrated here).  It is to be hoped that these capacities are utilised 
and maximised in a thoughtful and strategic way by the Northern Irish administration in going 
forward. 
 
107 Northern Ireland operates an Affordable Warmth Scheme along these lines, see: 
<https://touch.nihe.gov.uk/index/benefits/affordable_warmth_scheme.htm>  accessed 27 April 2019 
Issues, problems and solutions pertaining to energy efficiency and housing stock in the context of fuel poverty 
are treated in detail in Chapter 6 of Brenda Boardman, Fixing Fuel Poverty: Challenges and Solutions (UK: 
Earthscan, 2010), 125-166.  Research has detected a problem in Northern Ireland where households suffering 
the worst fuel poverty rates may not necessarily fit the criteria for energy efficiency upgrades, see: Ryan Walker, 
Christine Liddell, Paul McKenzie, Chris Morris and Susan  Lagdon, ‘Fuel poverty in Northern Ireland: Humanizing 
the plight of vulnerable households’ (2014) 4 Energy Research & Social Science, 89-99. 
108 In spite of certain tensions between energy efficiency obligations and targeted fuel poverty alleviation 
policies, UK Government has favoured energy efficiency obligations as a main policy for reducing fuel poverty; 
See further Jan Rosenow, Reg Platt, and Brooke Flanagan, ‘Fuel poverty and energy efficiency obligations–A 
critical assessment of the supplier obligation in the UK’ (2013) 62 Energy Policy, 1194-1203. 
109 Geraint Ellis, Richard Cowell, Fionnguala Sherry-Brennan, Peter A Strachan and David Toke, ‘Planning, Energy 
and Devolution in the UK’ (2013) 84 (3) Town Planning Review 397, 404; Thomas L Muinzer, ‘Warming Up: 
Northern Ireland’s Developing Response to Climate Change in the Context of UK Devolution’, 
(September/October, 2016) (96) UKELA E-Law, 19-22. 
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On the other hand, Energy Constitution theory also crystalises additional recognitions and 
qualifications.  ‘Fuel poverty’ ranges beyond reasonably clear-cut issues of energy/fuel, 
including going beyond the already challenging issue of the pricing of fuel in the context of 
fluctuating energy markets.  For instance, issues around health and age are raised.  Research 
has found that fuel poverty has a tendency to negatively impact human health, with significant 
physical health impacts being detectable in children and infants, and notable mental health 
effects being detected amongst adults and adolescents.110  In terms of age more generally, 
research shows that the elderly tend to be especially vulnerable to fuel poverty.111  Complex 
psychological drivers can also be operative.  For example, Price, Brazier and Wang’s work 
shows that those who ‘feel’ fuel poor (subjectively) may or may not meet conventional 
objective fuel poverty standards; there can be some disparity between subjective feeling and 
objective income-to-energy affordability in this area (this should perhaps come as no surprise, 
given the technical nature of the objective measurement criteria, and the uncertainties in 
general that surround complex internal human responses and subjective psychology).112 
 
Most particularly, however, given the nature of the constitutional powers discussed above, it is 
notable that (fuel) poverty connects with wider, additional complexities.  These include issues 
involving levels of income, household expenditure, taxation, and, in sum, fundamental macro 
and micro market and income conditions and challenges that are both bound up with and that 
underpin the workings of the stte’s broader national economy.  With the main economic leavers 
in the UK being scaled to the national level, including tax control (mapped to the national level 
above),113 Northern Ireland’s ability to deal autonomously with fuel poverty’s broader 
underlying economic challenges and contributing influences seems relatively weak.  Christman 
has pointed out that a facility to shape the law in the area of social security is devolved to 
Northern Ireland114; given that income inequality is a significant driver of fuel poverty, this 
could afford Northern Ireland significant room to provide some relief to the fuel poor through 
this channel.  However, substantial cutting in and hollowing out is at play here.  Thus, 
Christman describes the devolved capacity for agency in this area as ‘notional competence’ 
that is ‘subject to the “parity principle”’,115 that is, the principle that parity between social 
security in Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK is to be encouraged, and where the UK-
level Secretary of State is given a formal role in balancing the system with the appropriate 
 
110 Christine Liddell and Chris Morris, ‘Fuel poverty and human health: a review of recent evidence’ (2010) 38.6 
Energy Policy 2987-2997. 
111 Tracey O’Neill, Clare Jinks and Anne Squire, ‘“Heating Is More Important Than Food” Older Women’s 
Perceptions of Fuel Poverty’(2006) 20.3 Journal of Housing for the Elderly, 95-108. 
112 Catherine Waddams Price, Karl Brazier and Wenjia Wang, ‘Objective and subjective measures of fuel 
poverty’(2012) 49 Energy Policy,  33-39. 
113 Although dated now in relation to the UK’s contemporary policy landscape, insightful analysis of carbon taxes 
and their potential impact on aspects of fuel poverty provided by Brenda Boardman in 1993 remains useful in 
terms of the general principles under examination, see: Brenda Boardman, ‘Opportunities and constraints posed 
by fuel poverty on policies to reduce the greenhouse effect in Britain’ (1993) 44.2 Applied Energy, 185-195. 
114 Ben Christman, Moving from Cold Laws to Warm Homes: Energy Justice and the Law on Fuel Poverty in the 
UK (Doctoral Thesis, Queen’s University Belfast, 2017), 234. 
115 The principle is set down at NIA 1998, s.87(1). 
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Northern Ireland Minister.116  Christman also notes that Northern Ireland is constrained by 
substantial budgetary considerations in terms of how it administers its social security system, 
with the overall budget itself for Northern Ireland being set at Westminster.117  Thus he 
characterises these powers as a very narrow basis on which Northern Ireland might seek to act 
in the sphere of fuel poverty.118 
 
More broadly, and perhaps somewhat paradoxically, it may be to some extent desirable that 
certain core aspects of the controls that might permit Northern Ireland and the other Devolved 
Administrations to better attend to these sorts of dimensions of the fuel poverty problem should 
be beyond the devolved regions’ immediate grasp (as they are at present, in the case of Scotland 
and Wales as well as Northern Ireland).  This may be the case insofar as adjusting the Energy 
Constitution so that the devolved institutions can enjoy radical autonomy to act in the sphere 
of the economy could result in a lack of joined-up thinking that might distort or otherwise 
negatively impact the UK economy’s broader workings.  This could arise where Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales might seek to leverage their internal economic controls to benefit 
their own internal energy economies in a manner resulting in complex competitive conditions 
between the substate jurisdictions: devoid of a substantial overarching national-level balancing  
influence, this could generate complicated and potentially unforeseen ‘winners and losers’ 
across the broader UK economy, and, indeed, could conceivably intensify fuel poverty levels 
in certain regions. 
 
The Energy Constitution paradigm also invites consideration of rights and equity.  In the 
introductory Abstract to his important paper ‘Energy, Equity and the Future of the Fuel Poor’, 
Roberts notes that:  
 
A warm and adequately-lit home is considered a basic need, together with access to 
energy-consuming appliances ranging from a fridge to a TV. An underlying tenet of 
sustainable energy is that such basic needs should be affordably met.119   
 
Where one locates the conditions of the fuel poor in the context of equity in the manner that 
Roberts does, this is certainly an appropriate observation and conclusion (such basic needs 
should be affordably met).  The Energy Constitution framework, however, suggests that one 
could perhaps go further here.  Constitutions normally accord the public citizen with rights, 
and in the context of the UK’s uncodified constitution one normally turns to the Human Rights 
Act 1998 to find the major list of rights set out.120  One finds here a right to life,121 a right to 
freedom from forced labour,122 a right to a fair trial,123 and so on.  The rights do not include a 
 
116 See Supra n.115 (Christman) n.104, 234, including footnote n.889. 
117 Ibid (Christman), 234. 
118 Ibid (Christman), 234–235. 
119 Simon Roberts, ‘Energy, equity and the future of the fuel poor’ (2008) 36.12 Energy Policy, 4471-4474, 4471. 
120 Human Rights Act 1998. 
121 Human Rights Act 1998, Schedule 1 Article 2. 
122 Human Rights Act 1998, Schedule 1 Article 4. 
123 Human Rights Act 1998, Schedule 1 Article 6. 
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right to energy / right to affordable sustainable energy, or equivalent.  If Roberts is correct in 
construing sustainable energy as a basic need that should be affordably met – as he surely is124 
– then a right to energy, however it might best be phrased, should arguably be implied into / 
read into the UK’s Energy Constitution.  Identifying and establishing an implied right in this 
way is not uncommon in terms of the way in which constitutional law often works.  For 
example, recently in 2017 Friends of the Irish Environment brought a case before Ireland’s 
High Court where it was determined by the court that although the written Irish Constitution 
does not set out an explicit fundamental environmental right, such a right can be said to exist.125  
Thus, the judge, Mr Justice Max Barrett, asserted that: 
 
Concrete duties and responsibilities will fall in time to be defined and demarcated. But 
to start down that path of definition and demarcation, one first has to recognise that 
there is a personal constitutional right to an environment that is consistent with the 
human dignity and well-being of citizens at large and upon which those duties and 
responsibilities will be constructed. This the court does.126 
 
Although, of course, the constitutions of Ireland and the UK differ somewhat in terms of their 
technical form and nature, it is certainly arguable along the same lines of general principle that 
an affordable energy-oriented right should be read into the UK’s constitutional rights 
framework in a similar way.  This is something that the UK courts could explicitly clarify (or 
reject), as and when an appropriate court case begging the question arises.  If it were to be 
accepted that such an implied right does exist, then the right to (affordable) energy must be 
interpreted as an operative feature of the Energy Constitution where the framework is applied 
to the UK.  This would mean that the state has an emphatic rights-based constitutional duty to 
create conditions where fuel poverty will not prevent households from achieving adequate 
levels of affordable heat and electricity. 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
This study has developed and applied an ‘Energy Constitution’ analytical framework in the 
context of fuel poverty, taking the UK as a case study in order to concretise the inquiry and 
honing in most particularly on Northern Ireland. The Energy Constitution model recognises 
the following: 
This perspective… emphasises the need to appreciate the way in which law must be 
viewed within wider contexts, and instead of simple ‘doctrines’ we should think of the 
 
124 For more on the ethical assumptions pertaining to (in)justice underpinning a designation of ‘fuel poverty’, 
see Gordon Walker and Rosie Day, ‘Fuel Poverty as Injustice: Integrating Distribution, Recognition and Procedure 
in the Struggle for Affordable Warmth’ (2012) 49 Energy Policy,  69–75. 
125 Merriman & Ors v Fingal County Council & Ors; Friends of the Irish Environment Clg v Fingal County Council & 
Ors [2017] IEHC 695. 
126 Ibid. (per Mr Justice Max Barrett), at Paragraph [264]. 
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‘Energy Constitution’ as being composed of a complicated spectrum of legal spatialities 
where jurisdictional boundaries are pluralistic, fuzzy and fluid. These circumstances 
are inextricably bound up with the multi-scalar complexities underlying the 
decarbonisation challenge, which in turn cannot be effectively isolated from pertinent 
legal frameworks.127 
It has been seen that divergent substate spatialities and regional differences exert influential 
forces on the issue of fuel poverty, and it has been highlighted that Northern Ireland had the 
highest rates of fuel poverty in the UK (42% of Northern Irish households in fuel poverty in 
2011) until the most recent round of reporting established that a drop in these levels has 
subsequently occurred (a 20% drop to 22% for 2016, reported May 2018).128  The analysis has 
clarified that Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions are possessed of a pronounced capacity 
to act in the sphere of fuel poverty within the setting of these fluid, multi-scalar conditions.  
The UK’s particular Energy Constitution has imbued the state’s devolved regions with 
divergent asymmetric powers, which interact in turn with inherent socio-spatial regional 
differences.  In a system where the UK’s devolved institutions are at significant liberty to 
employ their devolved powers within their nuanced regional settings as they see fit in the 
interest of best serving their constituents, it is natural that variation should arise both in terms 
of practical governance approaches and in terms of fuel poverty mitigation outcomes.   
Walker has noted in the context of a consideration of the microgeneration of heat and electricity 
that uncertainty surrounds the extent to which decentralised and distributed energy systems 
might remedy sweeping fuel poverty problems129; it can be similarly difficult to assess the 
extent to which decentralised governance systems are useful in combatting the problem, as in 
the case of devolution, where devolved institutions, local authorities, and so forth have some 
inherent facility to play an important role in tackling the problem within the state’s devolved 
jurisdictions.  Nevertheless, it should be stressed that multilevel governmental actors have an 
obligation to employ available powers to the best of their ability to redress fuel poverty, 
including key actors at the devolved level of governance.  This is particularly the case insofar 
as research has demonstrated that the energy vulnerable have limited agency to reduce their 
own vulnerability in their own right.130  Research has also shown that better regulation of 
domestic pricing structures can be a vital tool in reducing fuel poverty,131 again highlighting 
how it is not appropriate to place the primary onus for determining solutions on the energy 
‘consumer’.  Simshauser, Nelson and Doan believe that a complex reaction they describe as 
the ‘Boomerang Paradox’ occurs in the context of growing advanced economies: on one hand, 
 
127 Supra n.1 (Muinzer and Ellis), 1190. 
128 AFPSR, 2018, pp.84-85 (Supra n.7). 
129 Gordon Walker, ‘Decentralised systems and fuel poverty: Are there any links or risks?’ (2008) 36 (12) Energy 
Policy,  4514-4517. 
130 Lucie Middlemiss and Ross Gillard, ‘Fuel Poverty from the Bottom-Up: Characterising Household Energy 
Vulnerability through the Lived Experience of the Fuel Poor’ (2015) 6 Energy Research & Social Science, 146–
154. 
131 Kimberley C. O’Sullivan, Philippa L. Howden-Chapman, and Geoff Fougere, ‘Making the connection: The 
relationship between fuel poverty, electricity disconnection, and prepayment metering’ (2011) 39.2 Energy 
Policy, 733-741.  This research centres on prepayment metering in New Zealand, but clearly holds lessons for 
the UK setting also. 
“Conceptualising the Energy Constitution: Lessons from Northern Ireland” 
Thomas L Muinzer, Energy Policy (2020), Manuscript Version 
such healthily growing economies serve to cause general household incomes to rise and the 
costs of electrical appliances to depress; but on the other hand, they simultaneously necessitate 
greater power grid capacities, serving in turn to create conditions for augmented fuel poverty.132  
If their analysis is correct, it speaks to the theme of governmental actors and other appropriate 
regulatory bodies having an obligation to intervene on behalf of the public so that the poorest 
do not fall victim to these sorts of systemic forces.  
 
The fuel poverty prognosis for the future in Northern Ireland had seemed bleak, but the recent 
reduction in levels from 42% to 22% of households in fuel poverty, while still not acceptable, 
is encouraging.  It had been stated that: 
If Northern Ireland retains a 10% threshold, …fuel poverty rates are likely to increase 
rapidly in the coming years. This is because the majority of households in Northern 
Ireland who are not already fuel poor are clustered close to the 10% threshold. Falls in 
income and rising energy prices will move many tens of thousands of these households 
into fuel poverty. …The net result is that churn around the threshold is likely to be 
dominated by people falling into, rather than moving out of fuel poverty.133  
These valid concerns have not been realised in the most recent reporting round, due to a 
lowering in average fuel prices and a general increase in income, combined with efforts from 
the devolved administration to improve energy efficiency in housing stock. 
However, this research clarifies that it will be necessary for Northern Ireland’s devolved 
substate governance institutions to recognise that they have relatively extensive powers 
permitting them to engage with the problem of fuel poverty in a more targeted and robust 
manner than has hitherto been the case.  This facility for agency brings with it in turn an 
obligation to leverage these extensive powers and the associated capacities for action under the 
Energy Constitution within the UK in order to drive solutions to these problems.  UK fuel 
poverty was flagged by Bradshaw and Hutton as a challenge that was likely due to grow as far 
back as 1983134; it is certainly high time key governance actors set their shoulder to the wheel 
of utilising their agency as a means of resolving the substantial levels of fuel poverty that 
continue to persist in Northern Ireland, and beyond. 
More broadly, this study highlights a need for further targeted research that considers and 
investigates the extent to which the Energy Constitution model can be applied in wider 
international settings within states in order to elucidate aspects of fuel poverty policy and 
governance in countries elsewhere.  It also highlights a need for additional research along 
Energy Constitution lines that examines and explores other major multi-scalar energy-specific 
policy challenges within states (i.e., problems that differ from fuel poverty), including 
 
132 Paul Simshauser, Tim Nelson and Thao Doan, ‘The boomerang paradox, Part I: How a nation's wealth is 
creating fuel poverty’ (2011) 24.1 The Electricity Journal,  72-91. 
133 Supra n.69 (Liddell), 31. 
134 Jonathan Bradshaw and Sandra Hutton, ‘Social policy options and fuel poverty’ (1983) 3.3-4 Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 249-266. 
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* In the NIHCSMP 2016, for the first time, Northern Ireland also reported on the 
‘Low Income High Costs’/LIHC fuel poverty indicator used in England. The findings 
show that 7% of households were in fuel poverty under this definition and this 
compared with 11% in England (2015). The average fuel poverty gap for all Northern 
Ireland households was estimated at £436 (£353 in England 2015). This indicates 
that while the extent of fuel poverty under LIHC is less in Northern Ireland, the depth 
or severity is greater than in England (see Supra n.3, AFPSR, 2018), 85. 
 
 
** Note that Wales’ “methodology differs from Scotland in relation to the heating 
assumptions used”, such that the Scottish and Welsh indicators are non-additive: 
quoting AFPSR, 2016, p.24 (Supra n.3); reiterated at AFPSR, 2017, 72 and AFPSR, 
2018, 84 (Supra n.3). 
 
 
*** Calculation of fuel poverty levels is an inaccurate science, albeit a useful one.  
For example, in discussing the English fuel poverty modelling outputs, the FPMH 
notes that it amounts to a ‘point estimate’ of the number of households affected, 
which involves certain ‘approximations’.  Thus: “the modelling process requires 
numerous assumptions. For example, there is no information on the energy supplier 
and the tariff that a household uses. Instead, households are assigned an average price 
depending on the region that they live in and the way in which they pay for their 
energy (e.g. standard credit, direct debit, etc.).” Quoting FPMH (Supra n.5), 63. 
 
**** This Bill is before the Scottish Parliament at the time of writing. 
 
***** Scotland is the only UK jurisdiction which has published a more recent 
housing condition survey and thus its fuel poverty statistics are most up-to-date.  The 
figures are contained in the report ‘Scottish Housing Condition Survey: 2017 Key 
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